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Abstract: For long-duration automated operation of regenerative life support systems in 
space environments, there is a need for advanced integration and control systems that are 
significantly more reliable and safe, and that support error recovery and minimization of 
operational failures. This presentation outlines some challenges of hazardous space 
environments and complex system interactions that can lead to system accidents. It 
discusses approaches to hazard analysis and error recovery for control software and 
challenges of supporting effective intervention by safety software and the crew. 
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Overview 
• Definitions 
• Challenges of hazardous environment and 
new technology 
• Hazard analysis for complex systems 
• Hazard reduction for control software 
• Future safety-conscious systems 
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Definitions 
• Advanced Integration and Control: broadly includes control, 
procedures, schedules, safety, coordination, communication, 
and anomaly response 
• Performance: throughput, latency, efficiency 
• Functionality: level of service 
• Reliability and safety: handling of failures, faults and errors 
- Controlled system, control platform, human operators 
• Vulnerabilitieslhazards: unacceptable system weaknesses or 
states that can contribute to a loss 
• Safeguards: methods to prevent or eliminate vulnerabilities or 
hazards and reduce risk (likelihood x severity) 
Challenges of Hazardous Environment, Maturing 
Technology, and Closed Recycling Systems 
• Incorrect specifications and assumptions are 
inevitable for new technology in harsh conditions 
- Unexpected system states 
- Operators and software will need to solve problems and 
adapt to unavoidable unanticipated situations 
• Complexity and interaction in tight coupling 
- Dynamic interactions in closed set of recycling systems 
with minimal buffers 
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System Accidents 
• Interactive systems, tight coupling, complexity 
- Difficulty in analysis leading to unanticipated situations that are 
difficult to understand when they happen 
- Combinations and synergistic effects: common causes, canceling 
failures, side effects, command combinations and timing 
- Interactions in dynamic complex trajectories or histories: distant 
effects, compensating mechanisms 
• Surprise due to mismatch between operations and 
system state 
- Missing information: concealed ignored/missed 
- Wrong information: misleading, misinterpreted 
• Damaging omissions or errors in control, 
operations or safety response 
- Failure to respond appropriately - not available or misapplied 
Vulnerabilities of Control Software 
• Incompleteness in software requirements 
- Incomplete or wrong assumptions about operation of 
controlled system or supporting computer systems 
- Omitted or ambiguous handling of controlled-system states 
and environmental conditions, including violated 
assumptions and overload 
• Software-related hazards 
- Failing to perform required function 
- Performing function inappropriately 
- Failing to coordinate functions (wrong time, wrong order) 
- Failing to respond appropriately to hazardous condition 
(not recognized, wrong response) 
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Hazard Analysis for Complex Systems 
• Model-based hazard analysis project 
• Hazard identification tool 
• Simulation to evaluate design and operations 
• Specifying vulnerabilities and safeguards 
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Model-based Hazard Analysis for 
Complex Systems 
• Address the problem of safety due to system 
complexity that leads to incomplete requirements 
- Model-Based Hazard Analysis for Interacting Systems - Engineering 
for Complex Systems Program (1. MalinlPI) 
• Guide the engineer in evaluating system designs and 
identifying hazards and hazard scenarios 
• Model, analyze and simulate unanticipated hazards 
and interactions in system operations 
- Effects of faults , errors and failures to act when expected 
• Focus analysis and simulation strategy to find 
unanticipated system accident scenarios 
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Hazard Identification Tool: Specifying Water System Vu lnerabilities and Safeguards 9 
Hazards in Generic Component Library 
CONFIG hybrid device models for early design, with selectable 
fai lure behavior for problem types in system accidents 
Focus is on thennohydraulic processing and management of fluids 
Water Recovery, Air Revitalization, ISRU and Thermal Control cases 
Capabilities for simulating combined, cascading and global effects of 
local problems 
2-PORT -FLU I D. DEV I CE HEHICAL -REACTOR-TUBE ----tHEH-REACTOR-VESSEL ~AS-SEPARATOR 
LOW-MET~R ONST-FLOW-PUMP~ 
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Selectable Failure Behavior 
Styles of modeling failures and degradation 
- Discrete changes tri ggered by failures and problem inputs 
• Immediate or delayed changes to state, behavior mode or contro l regime 
- Continuous degradation triggered by fai lures and problem inputs 
- Nontemporal algebraic relations 
Performance level affected by condi tions 
• Failures to operate or change upon input: stuck flags 
• Random variation in measurement or input 
Degrading and regenerating processing performance 
Reactors and separators with multi-component mixtures 
- Add and remove contaminants in rapid fluid composition changes 
- Migrate products, gas or liquid to wrong outflow 
- Imbalance process with feed or flow reversal problems 
Resource providers with alternative methods for reacting to excessive 
demands from multiple loads 
Leaks as specifiable additions to simulation scenarios 
Safeguard specification 
• System design protects against vulnerabilities 
Unacceptable system weaknesses or hazardous states 
Identify and classify conditions or causes (input) and problem 
effects (output) 
• Safeguards prevent, reduce or mitigate hazards 
Phase when applied 
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• Prevent conditions, prevent evolution to failure state, prevent impacts 
or damage 
• Respond to fa ilure state, respond to impacts 
Method 
• Isolation and barriers 
• Detection, analysis and control 
Robustness: buffers/margi ns, redundancy/multiples, limited impact 
(e.g., fail operational) 
• Repair, renewal or maintenance 
.~~ -.~~~~~~~~-
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Automated Data Collection and 
Routine Review for Safeguards 
System Safeguard Knowledge: 
Safeguard Name: Divert to feed tank 
Types: Buffer, control 
Agent: software automation [or hardware or human operator] 
Verification 
type: inspection 
schedule: automated tank level sampling every 5 seconds 
date/time last verified: runtime value 
Measure of success: level goes below alarm level within 2 hours 
Reporting requirements: add record of occurrences to daily performance 
summaries 
Hazard Reduction for Control Software 
• Types of hazard reduction for control software 
• Safety executive for error control 
• Error recovery methods for control software 
• Support for human analysis and intervention 
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Hazard Reduction for Control Software 
• Hazard reduction: make control software 
failure less likely 
- Barriers: lockouts, lockins, interlocks 
- Detection and control: make system, control 
software and supporting computer systems 
easier to control and monitor 
- Robustness: redundancy, safety margins and 
error recovery 
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Safety Executive for Error Control 
• Safety kernel or safety executive to centralize and 
encapsulate safety mechanisms 
• Detection of unsafe conditions by external 
application modules 
- Safety assertions, safeguard reports and watchdog 
processes 
• Responsibility for enforcing safety policy and 
deciding safeguard mechanism for handling 
problem 
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Error Recovery for Advanced Control 
• Robustness 
- Robustness and redundancy in data and computation 
- Limited partial shutdowns and reconfigurations 
- Backward recovery (robustness roll back): detect error, 
return to good state (checkpoint) and proceed with 
alternative version 
• Forward recovery (repair): detect and correct 
erroneous state and consequences 
- Intervention and resumption need careful checking 
• Possibility of incorrect assumptions in requirements 
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Support for Human Analysis and Intervention 
• Help operators gain situational awareness (orienting 
for intervention) 
• Help operators manage varying degrees of autonomy 
• Help operators interact with control agent and safety 
executive for intervention 
- Understand policy and choose recovery mechanisms 
- Complete and negotiate abstract or sketched "command" 
• Change monitoring, control, or constraints and priorities for plans 
and procedures 
- Evaluate recovery plans and procedures and associated 
control software changes and commands 
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Future Safety Conscious Systems 
• Barriers and robustness to problems 
• Coordination with safety executive and intervening 
human operators 
- Detection with safety assertions, safeguard reports and 
watchdog processes 
- Control with embedded knowledge of vulnerabilities and 
safeguards 
• Response plan evaluation with simulation before 
resuming interrupted operations 
- Simulation scenarios with embedded potential failures 
To LeamMore 
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